ABSTRACT
Collective action is a recurrent problem for citizens of democratic societies. Collective action organizations are social systems comprised of two interdependent components—the individual member and the institution. Individuals choose their involvements in collective action organizations on the basis of their rational cost—benefit calculations, their desires to conform to group norms, and their affective ties to the collectivity. The chapter presents a political economy theory that emphasizes the macro-micro linkages. It discusses a synthesized model that blends components of all three approaches. These include: rational choice, normative conformity, and affective bonding. Rational choice or subjective expected utility models have a long pedigree in the social sciences, beginning in neoclassical economics. Rational decision making poses a dilemma for collective action organizations that offer only public goods as inducements for their members’ resource contributions. If economics is the province of rational choice theory, sociology is properly the domain of the normative conformity model.
