Public reason debated

The United States has been the main backdrop of much of the debate on public reason (Audi 2001; Weithman 2002; Wolterstorff 2012b; Vallier and d’Agostino 2014). In past decades, the politicization of Evangelical Protestantism shaped the identity of the American political right and generated a clash with liberal activists and civil rights movements over various issues, ranging from abortion and same-sex marriage to religious exemptions and genetic engineering. These controversies have led to a “cultural war” (Hunter 1992; Dworkin 2013) and have defined central points of the political agenda in different presidential campaigns in the US (Espinosa 2008). The key role of religion in the lives of many American citizens, ¹ the length of the cultural war, and the presence of religion in politics, are all factors that have nurtured a rich tradition of academic inquiry. In particular, the political polarization over values is a serious test for the Rawlsian project of reconciliation (Chapter 1). In times of deep disagreement on fundamental moral and political issues, the Rawlsian vision of an overlapping consensus rooted into the soil of a shared commitment to public reason appears over-optimistic. A number of liberal, feminist, and other critics have argued that the Rawlsian stance gives too prominent a role to religion in democratic politics and society. By separating the political and the comprehensive domain, Rawls would undermine individual autonomy and gloss over the fundamental incompatibilities between religious and liberal views with respect to family, school, and minority groups (see in Chapter 7 Okin’s criticism of Rawls and defence of autonomy liberalism). Moreover, by welcoming the use of religious language in politics outside of the public political forum, the public reason approach would underestimate the relation between institutionalized religion and domination (see Chapter 8 for Rorty’s criticism and defence of postmodern liberalism).