ABSTRACT
The problem of induction arises because it seems impossible to gain a non-circular justification for induction. One way in which commentators have responded to this problem is by arguing that such a fundamental epistemic practice does not stand in need of justification. A similar approach defends induction on epistemic externalist grounds. A more radical proposal, known as falsificationism, argues that the problem of induction does not undermine as much of our knowledge as we thought because most apparently inductive knowledge – in particular, most scientific knowledge – is in fact gained via deduction. On this view, rather than make tentative inferences from observed regularities, scientists in fact formulate bold hypotheses that they then try to decisively refute, or falsify. According to the pragmatic way of living with the problem of induction, one concedes that one lacks a justification for induction, but argues that, nonetheless, employing induction is the most rational thing to do. This is because if any method of inference is going to get us true beliefs about the world, it will be induction.
