ABSTRACT
The problem of other minds concerns the fact that it seems that we are unable to observe another person’s mind in the same way that we can observe physical objects like tables and chairs. So how, then, do we know that there are other minds? One way to try to resolve this problem is to make use of the argument from analogy, which notes correlations between our behaviour and our mental states, and thereby inductively draws conclusions about the mental states of others who behave in ways that are similar to how we behave. The style of reasoning employed in the argument from analogy is defective, however, since one cannot legitimately reason from a correlation that holds in a single (and apparently unrepresentative) case to a general conclusion that applies to many cases. Even if we can establish that there are other minds, how could we be sure that they were like ours (e.g. that others experience the world in similar ways to how we experience it)? Finally, we consider the idea that we can, at least sometimes, have direct knowledge of another person’s mind. For example, if I see someone writhing around on the ground before me, I could come to know, without needing to make any inference, that this person is in pain.
