ABSTRACT
To say that truth is objective is to say that merely thinking that the world is a certain way does not entail that it is that way. This thesis goes hand in hand with fallibilism, since the key idea behind objectivism is that our beliefs can be wrong.
We can distinguish between a strong form of objectivism, which holds that it is always possible for our beliefs to be wrong, and a weak form of objectivism, which merely holds that what we believe right now could be wrong. The former view we called realism about truth, and it holds that the truth can in principle outstrip our best inquiries. In contrast, weak objectivism is consistent with anti-realism, the view that truth cannot ultimately outstrip best opinion. One motivation for anti-realism comes from the thought that a realist conception of truth is in some sense an idle cog in inquiry. The anti-realist poses an important challenge to the realist, which is to explain why we value truth given that it can on this view undetectably outstrip best opinion. The answer to this question may lie in the fact that we value authenticity, even when such authenticity is undetectable. Finally, we consider relativism, the view that truth is just what you think it is. Such a view is self-defeating.
