Introduction

Argumentation theory, or the theory of argument, has (re-)emerged as an important focal point of interdisciplinary research and interest. ¹ Not just philosophers and logicians but also linguists, speech communication theorists, rhetoricians, and psychologists—among others—have written extensively about it. In my own discipline of philosophy, what has come to be known in some circles as the Informal Logic Movement has been partly responsible for bringing the theory of argument back into the limelight. But there are other philosophical sources of interest. Thus, Habermas (1981) wrote, “The concept of rationality that I have introduced…has to be elucidated in terms of a theory of argumentation. Notwithstanding a venerable tradition going back to Aristotle, however, this theory is still in its beginnings” (p. 22). Habermas was right in wanting to connect rationality and argumentation, but I think he had it backwards: rationality first, argumentation afterward. In other words, if the practice of argumentation is to be understood, it must be understood in terms of rationality. A basic theme developed in this book is that the practice of argumentation is best understood as an exercise in manifest rationality.