ABSTRACT
A complete theoretical formulation of information processing must specify the content and structure of memory, the storage and retrieval processes that are involved in the transmission of knowledge throughout the cognitive system, and the way this knowledge comes into play in the pursuit of specific goals to which it is relevant. Wyer and Srull’s (1989) theory attains many of these objectives, and several features of this earlier theory are retained in the conceptualization I now propose. However, several assumptions of the earlier formulation must be modified in order to account for the processing of information about familiar people and events that is acquired through direct experience. Before describing these modifications, certain limitations of the earlier model are worth noting. (These limitations are shared by other, more restricted conceptualizations of social information processing as well; see Brewer, 1998; Carlston, 1994; Smith, 1990; Wyer & Carlston, 1979.)
LIMITATIONS OF WYER AND SRULL’S (1989) THEORY
The Comprehension and Validation of Information About Familiar People and Events
Perhaps the most general deficiency of the original model is its failure to specify the operations that govern the comprehension of information at the time the information is first encountered, before goal-directed cognitive ac-
tivity is initiated. Wyer and Srull simply assumed that input information is spontaneously encoded in terms of “low level” semantic concepts that are applied independently of the modality in which the information is received. They provided no indication of how this is done. Furthermore, their assumption that all incoming information is encoded semantically constrains the model’s ability to address the comprehension of information that pertains to people and events about which one already has substantial knowledge. The model assumed that referent-specific knowledge does not come into play until a later, goal-directed stage of processing.
