ABSTRACT

This chapter draws upon the work of two contemporary feminist philosophers, Drucilla Cornell and Christine Battersby, to question what it means to be a person, and the relationship between this image of being a person and law. I use the term ‘metaphysics’ to delineate an area of thought that raises questions about what it means to be a ‘person’; to have, or to be, a ‘self’, and the relationship between this self and others. In the law school, ‘law’ is considered in a number of ways: constitutional law; debates about citizenship; and in terms of legal subject areas such as family, contract, tort, crime, etc. Whilst feminism may be taught in law schools, it is not always the case that the way in which subjects are defined is useful to feminism. For example, within constitutional law it is easy to assume that law must be seen as operating in a ‘top-down’ manner; that the legislature passes the law to tell us what we can and cannot do.