ABSTRACT
After DPP v P, it was thought for a short period by some judges that Lord Mackay had left striking similarity as an essential test in trials where identification was in dispute. But in R v W (John)31 the Court of Appeal held that this was a misinterpretation, and that there is no special rule in identification cases requiring striking similarity. In delivering the judgment of the Court, Hooper J emphasised the basic test: does the similar fact evidence have such weight that it would be fair to use it, notwithstanding its prejudicial effect? Similar fact evidence that is relevant to identification may acquire its weight from features that are strikingly similar, but that is not the only way in which it may do so. He also emphasised another basic principle: evidence that is merely of disposition or bad character will lack sufficient weight to be admitted as similar fact evidence. A similar point was made in R v Musquera,32 where the Court of Appeal said that while the decision in DPP v P had eliminated the necessity to identify a striking similarity, it was still necessary to be able to point to some common feature or features constituting a significant connection between the similar fact evidence and the evidence in the current trial, and going beyond mere propensity or coincidence.
