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R v Ali [1995] Crim LR 303 (CA) Facts: The appellant was convicted of robbery, having an imitation firearm with intent and possessing an imitation firearm when committing an offence. The appellant robbed a building society of £1,175, in the course of which he threatened cashiers with a gun. At trial he gave evidence that he had gone to Pakistan in 1987 and had become a heroin addict. One of the suppliers to whom he resorted was X, whom he refused to name but whom he knew to be a very violent person. He said the arrangement was that he would sell on the heroin he received from X and hand on the proceeds to him, as well as taking a certain amount for his own use. One day instead of selling on the bulk of the heroin, he used it all for his own purposes. That put him in debt to X, who threatened him and told him on several occasions that he would be shot. The appellant moved house, but X caught up with him, gave him a gun and told him he wanted the money the following day. The appellant was to get it from a bank or building society, otherwise he would be killed. The appellant was scared that X would return for him if he went to the police and so he committed the robbery. X took the money from him. On appeal, it was argued that the judge had not directed the jury correctly on the defence of duress, which was the burden of the appellant’s case. The judge had posed four questions for the jury, the last of which was whether the appellant, in obtaining heroin from X and supplying it to others for gain, after he knew of X’s reputation for violence, voluntarily put himself in a position where he knew that he was likely to be forced by X to commit a crime. It was submitted that it was not sufficient for the appellant knowing of X’s reputation for violence, voluntarily to put himself in a position where he knew he was likely to be forced by X to commit a crime; the judge should have said ‘forced by X to commit armed robbery’. Held, dismissing the appeal, the jury could not have read the words ‘a crime’ as referring back to the drug dealing, as opposed to some crime other than that which was the common currency of the relationship between the appellant and X. The crux of the matter was knowledge in the defendant of either a violent nature to the gang or the enterprise which he had joined, or a violent disposition in the person or persons involved with him in the criminal activity he voluntarily joined. If a defendant voluntarily participated in criminal offences with a man ‘X’, whom he knows to be of a violent disposition and likely to require him to perform other criminal acts, he could not rely on duress if ‘X’ does so. The judge’s summing up had expressed that proposition accurately. He had made it clear that, if there was no reason for a defendant to anticipate violence, then he would be entitled to rely on duress. But if he knew of a propensity for violence in those with whom he was working, then he could hardly rely on duress if they had threatened him with violence to make him do their bidding.
DOI link for R v Ali [1995] Crim LR 303 (CA) Facts: The appellant was convicted of robbery, having an imitation firearm with intent and possessing an imitation firearm when committing an offence. The appellant robbed a building society of £1,175, in the course of which he threatened cashiers with a gun. At trial he gave evidence that he had gone to Pakistan in 1987 and had become a heroin addict. One of the suppliers to whom he resorted was X, whom he refused to name but whom he knew to be a very violent person. He said the arrangement was that he would sell on the heroin he received from X and hand on the proceeds to him, as well as taking a certain amount for his own use. One day instead of selling on the bulk of the heroin, he used it all for his own purposes. That put him in debt to X, who threatened him and told him on several occasions that he would be shot. The appellant moved house, but X caught up with him, gave him a gun and told him he wanted the money the following day. The appellant was to get it from a bank or building society, otherwise he would be killed. The appellant was scared that X would return for him if he went to the police and so he committed the robbery. X took the money from him. On appeal, it was argued that the judge had not directed the jury correctly on the defence of duress, which was the burden of the appellant’s case. The judge had posed four questions for the jury, the last of which was whether the appellant, in obtaining heroin from X and supplying it to others for gain, after he knew of X’s reputation for violence, voluntarily put himself in a position where he knew that he was likely to be forced by X to commit a crime. It was submitted that it was not sufficient for the appellant knowing of X’s reputation for violence, voluntarily to put himself in a position where he knew he was likely to be forced by X to commit a crime; the judge should have said ‘forced by X to commit armed robbery’. Held, dismissing the appeal, the jury could not have read the words ‘a crime’ as referring back to the drug dealing, as opposed to some crime other than that which was the common currency of the relationship between the appellant and X. The crux of the matter was knowledge in the defendant of either a violent nature to the gang or the enterprise which he had joined, or a violent disposition in the person or persons involved with him in the criminal activity he voluntarily joined. If a defendant voluntarily participated in criminal offences with a man ‘X’, whom he knows to be of a violent disposition and likely to require him to perform other criminal acts, he could not rely on duress if ‘X’ does so. The judge’s summing up had expressed that proposition accurately. He had made it clear that, if there was no reason for a defendant to anticipate violence, then he would be entitled to rely on duress. But if he knew of a propensity for violence in those with whom he was working, then he could hardly rely on duress if they had threatened him with violence to make him do their bidding.
R v Ali [1995] Crim LR 303 (CA) Facts: The appellant was convicted of robbery, having an imitation firearm with intent and possessing an imitation firearm when committing an offence. The appellant robbed a building society of £1,175, in the course of which he threatened cashiers with a gun. At trial he gave evidence that he had gone to Pakistan in 1987 and had become a heroin addict. One of the suppliers to whom he resorted was X, whom he refused to name but whom he knew to be a very violent person. He said the arrangement was that he would sell on the heroin he received from X and hand on the proceeds to him, as well as taking a certain amount for his own use. One day instead of selling on the bulk of the heroin, he used it all for his own purposes. That put him in debt to X, who threatened him and told him on several occasions that he would be shot. The appellant moved house, but X caught up with him, gave him a gun and told him he wanted the money the following day. The appellant was to get it from a bank or building society, otherwise he would be killed. The appellant was scared that X would return for him if he went to the police and so he committed the robbery. X took the money from him. On appeal, it was argued that the judge had not directed the jury correctly on the defence of duress, which was the burden of the appellant’s case. The judge had posed four questions for the jury, the last of which was whether the appellant, in obtaining heroin from X and supplying it to others for gain, after he knew of X’s reputation for violence, voluntarily put himself in a position where he knew that he was likely to be forced by X to commit a crime. It was submitted that it was not sufficient for the appellant knowing of X’s reputation for violence, voluntarily to put himself in a position where he knew he was likely to be forced by X to commit a crime; the judge should have said ‘forced by X to commit armed robbery’. Held, dismissing the appeal, the jury could not have read the words ‘a crime’ as referring back to the drug dealing, as opposed to some crime other than that which was the common currency of the relationship between the appellant and X. The crux of the matter was knowledge in the defendant of either a violent nature to the gang or the enterprise which he had joined, or a violent disposition in the person or persons involved with him in the criminal activity he voluntarily joined. If a defendant voluntarily participated in criminal offences with a man ‘X’, whom he knows to be of a violent disposition and likely to require him to perform other criminal acts, he could not rely on duress if ‘X’ does so. The judge’s summing up had expressed that proposition accurately. He had made it clear that, if there was no reason for a defendant to anticipate violence, then he would be entitled to rely on duress. But if he knew of a propensity for violence in those with whom he was working, then he could hardly rely on duress if they had threatened him with violence to make him do their bidding.
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