ABSTRACT
The decision whereby the Prefect declared the acquisition of land including the applicant’s to be in the public interest was taken on 7 October 1982. On 19 November 1982, she applied to the administrative court to have that decision set aside. In civil cases, the ‘reasonable time’ for the purposes of A 6(1) usually began to run when the application was made to the court. In the present case, the period to be taken into consideration began on 19 November 1982 at the latest. In relation to the application of A 6(1), the period whose reasonableness fell to be reviewed took in the entirety of the proceedings, right up to the decision which disposed of the dispute. In the present case, resolving the dispute entailed bringing two sets of proceedings, one of which was still pending. The length of time to be considered accordingly exceeded 14 years. The reasonableness of the length of proceedings had to be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, and having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities. Expropriation proceedings were relatively complex, in particular as they came under the jurisdiction of two sets of courts. There were delays due to organisational difficulties and the applicant could not be held responsible for other delays. There were delays in the courts and delay on the part of the town
council. The total delay already exceeded what could be regarded as reasonable. There had accordingly been a violation of A 6(1). The judgment in which the Evry tribunal de grande instance held that the applicant was entitled to compensation from the expropriating town council was delivered after the end of the proceedings before the Commission. The domestic courts’ acknowledgment of the applicant’s right to compensation did not mean that she ceased to be a victim. She remained dispossessed of her property without any compensation after its unlawful expropriation by the administrative authorities and she had consequently not ceased to be a ‘victim’ within the meaning of A 25. As the proceedings to which she was a party had been so slow, it was unnecessary at that time for her to institute further proceedings in order to comply with the requirements of A 26. Nor could she be criticised for not awaiting the outcome of the proceedings pending in the Evry tribunal de grande instance. She had satisfied requirement of A 26 regarding exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Government’s objections were therefore dismissed. In 1982 the French authorities unlawfully expropriated the applicant’s property to develop an extensive residential area. By erecting new buildings, later sold individually, she had been permanently deprived of the chance of regaining possession of her land. Her only course was to seek compensation. Compensation for the loss sustained by the applicant could only constitute adequate reparation where it also took into account the damage arising from the length of the deprivation. It also had to be paid within a reasonable time. The court proceedings for compensation had already lasted five years and were continuing. Compensation had not to date begun to be paid, although it could have been agreed on even after the expropriation order had been issued. The potentially large sum that might be awarded at the end of the pending proceedings did not offset the previously noted failure to pay compensation and could not be decisive in view of the length of all the proceedings already instituted by the applicant. There had therefore been a violation of P1A1.
