ABSTRACT

These decrees were introduced in 1969, initially to an ambivalent reception from lawyer and layperson alike, not unlike that which greeted the introduction of the Bill which became the Family Law Act (FLA) 1996. The reasoning behind this initial opposition to the introduction of the two separation decrees was simple: Fact D brought divorce by consent into English law for the first time, and this was seen as a mixed blessing, while Fact E enabled an ‘innocent’ respondent to be divorced against his or, more usually, her will. Public opinion did secure protection for ‘innocent’ respondents on the basis that, as they did not themselves seek divorce, and indeed generally opposed it, it was right that adequate financial protection should be provided. This was thought to balance the mutually exclusive aims of recognising the sanctity of marriage, and giving due weight to one of the key principles of the divorce reform movement (that those marriages identified as dead should be given decent, timely and dignified burials).