Having persevered with the reading of the case and the notations, the differences between this Community case and common law reports is stark. The judges in the ECJ do not use analogy, poetic language, asides, stories, counter arguments. There is a veneer of scientific detachment in the language of the Court. The style is unadorned description, technical language without explanation, assertion, the summarising without comment of a wide range of arguments by the parties, the Advocate General, and the governments wishing to make observations. When the ECJ turns to the decisions it will make, it dismisses arguments without explanation with phrases such as, ‘this is misconceived’, ‘No, this is not right’ and states ‘this is the case’ without giving reasons why. The Court argues deductively without making any attempts to refer to policy. Yet, it must surely be aware of the policy dimensions of its decisions. If it had decided against Van Gend en Loos, then the power of the fledgling Community would have been severely diminished. In the view of the Advocate General, companies would follow the national customs tariffs and not be guided by the provisions of the treaty. The ECJ may well have been taking the opportunity to assert the power of the Community over the individual Member State. This is conjecture in the absence of any comment on policy from the Court itself. Potentially powerful and persuasive arguments were put forward that the ECJ did not have the jurisdiction to hear the case; the Court merely replied that they did have jurisdiction. This was based on the grounds that the meaning behind the question raised an issue of interpretation within its jurisdiction. The Court’s simplistic decision following from this that any arithmetical change, even if it resulted from a re-classification within the existing order rather than a deliberate increase, would constitute an infringement of the treaty—is severe and open to question. In the face of arguments that would concentrate upon the intention of Member States concerning infringement, the ECJ says any arithmetical increase constitutes an infringement irrespective of intention. Indeed, much policy has to be read into all judgments of the ECJ and this judgment is no exception. Perhaps given the tensions between Member States and their creation, the EC, this is a wise and deliberate policy. The Member States gave birth to something that, in many respects, is more powerful and can dictate terms to an individual Member State.

DOI link for Having persevered with the reading of the case and the notations, the differences between this Community case and common law reports is stark. The judges in the ECJ do not use analogy, poetic language, asides, stories, counter arguments. There is a veneer of scientific detachment in the language of the Court. The style is unadorned description, technical language without explanation, assertion, the summarising without comment of a wide range of arguments by the parties, the Advocate General, and the governments wishing to make observations. When the ECJ turns to the decisions it will make, it dismisses arguments without explanation with phrases such as, ‘this is misconceived’, ‘No, this is not right’ and states ‘this is the case’ without giving reasons why. The Court argues deductively without making any attempts to refer to policy. Yet, it must surely be aware of the policy dimensions of its decisions. If it had decided against Van Gend en Loos, then the power of the fledgling Community would have been severely diminished. In the view of the Advocate General, companies would follow the national customs tariffs and not be guided by the provisions of the treaty. The ECJ may well have been taking the opportunity to assert the power of the Community over the individual Member State. This is conjecture in the absence of any comment on policy from the Court itself. Potentially powerful and persuasive arguments were put forward that the ECJ did not have the jurisdiction to hear the case; the Court merely replied that they did have jurisdiction. This was based on the grounds that the meaning behind the question raised an issue of interpretation within its jurisdiction. The Court’s simplistic decision following from this that any arithmetical change, even if it resulted from a re-classification within the existing order rather than a deliberate increase, would constitute an infringement of the treaty—is severe and open to question. In the face of arguments that would concentrate upon the intention of Member States concerning infringement, the ECJ says any arithmetical increase constitutes an infringement irrespective of intention. Indeed, much policy has to be read into all judgments of the ECJ and this judgment is no exception. Perhaps given the tensions between Member States and their creation, the EC, this is a wise and deliberate policy. The Member States gave birth to something that, in many respects, is more powerful and can dictate terms to an individual Member State.

Having persevered with the reading of the case and the notations, the differences between this Community case and common law reports is stark. The judges in the ECJ do not use analogy, poetic language, asides, stories, counter arguments. There is a veneer of scientific detachment in the language of the Court. The style is unadorned description, technical language without explanation, assertion, the summarising without comment of a wide range of arguments by the parties, the Advocate General, and the governments wishing to make observations. When the ECJ turns to the decisions it will make, it dismisses arguments without explanation with phrases such as, ‘this is misconceived’, ‘No, this is not right’ and states ‘this is the case’ without giving reasons why. The Court argues deductively without making any attempts to refer to policy. Yet, it must surely be aware of the policy dimensions of its decisions. If it had decided against Van Gend en Loos, then the power of the fledgling Community would have been severely diminished. In the view of the Advocate General, companies would follow the national customs tariffs and not be guided by the provisions of the treaty. The ECJ may well have been taking the opportunity to assert the power of the Community over the individual Member State. This is conjecture in the absence of any comment on policy from the Court itself. Potentially powerful and persuasive arguments were put forward that the ECJ did not have the jurisdiction to hear the case; the Court merely replied that they did have jurisdiction. This was based on the grounds that the meaning behind the question raised an issue of interpretation within its jurisdiction. The Court’s simplistic decision following from this that any arithmetical change, even if it resulted from a re-classification within the existing order rather than a deliberate increase, would constitute an infringement of the treaty—is severe and open to question. In the face of arguments that would concentrate upon the intention of Member States concerning infringement, the ECJ says any arithmetical increase constitutes an infringement irrespective of intention. Indeed, much policy has to be read into all judgments of the ECJ and this judgment is no exception. Perhaps given the tensions between Member States and their creation, the EC, this is a wise and deliberate policy. The Member States gave birth to something that, in many respects, is more powerful and can dictate terms to an individual Member State.