ABSTRACT
The 1956 riots confirmed what the police force leadership of the 1950s already knew, i.e. that a ‘police force on the British model cannot be organised on the lines of a military establishment and in consequence is not adapted for internal security duties in strength’. Unlike other colonies, however, a specialised ‘paramilitary’ gendarmerie was thought inappropriate for Hong Kong. The growth of political consciousness meant that these ‘native administrations’ needed to be watched. The police committed to what was seen in some quarters as ‘non-police’ work, such as providing help and relief to the population during fires, floods and landslides, such measures were designed to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the native population. Apart from putting in place a striking force capable of dealing with internal disorder and developing ‘hearts and minds’ strategies, after the riots the Hong Kong government was equally keen to obtain intelligence about those it suspected of fermenting discontent.
