ABSTRACT
The chapter addresses the course of the Santal rebellion 1855–1856 from the early days of July 1855, through the dismantling of the East India Company’s (EIC) military operations in February 1856. The chapter is arranged chronologically but is also structured geographically, enabling the reader to consider Santal movements towards the west, the east and the south, respectively, from the core of the rebellion in the Damin-i-Koh. Reports found in the Bengal Judicial Proceedings contain the most comprehensive documentation, but the Santal experience is included insofar as possible from the later retrospective Santal narrations. Triangulating among these sources allows for the assessment of competing scholarly claims regarding the extent Santals and others backed the rebellion, and their possible plans and considerations of why the rebellion failed – among them the massive military response from the EIC and wealthy Indians who supported it. Micro-analysis shows that inconsistencies in the implementation of martial law emerged from competing EIC goals that included not only genuine safety and security issues, but also possibly an interest in terrorising Santals into accepting a more subservient position in society. In this regard, the Calcutta press offers relevant information, even if its analysis regarding the proclamation of martial law is indecisive.
