ABSTRACT
This chapter offers some criticisms of Bertrand Russell’s theory of modality and suggests that MDL would be the most natural theory of modality for the quantificational analytic tradition of Gottlob Frege, Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and W. V. O. Quine. Russell’s own suggested epistemic motive in 1918 may seem Johnny come lately in comparison. For Russell, a modal logic is as a modal logic does, and an existential logic is as an existential logic does. In effect, Russell’s insight is just that a hammer can also be used as a doorstop. Frege is saying that formally marking a proposition as apodictic adds nothing to showing it can be derived from axioms. Wittgenstein would regard admitting nonexistent objects in any literal sense as a bewitchment of grammar. Thus MDL does seem to be the most natural modal logic for the analytic tradition.
