ABSTRACT
For all the diversity among social scientists’ approaches to studying groups and associations in politics, they generally take a common position: that the most relevant societal forces are independent of the state (Almond and Verba 1963; Migdal 1988; Putnam 1993). More recently, however, a number of analyses have tried to modify this traditional approach. For example, a number of critics of the social capital literature have taken exception to what they regard as an excessively society-centric approach that minimizes the roles of government institutions in influencing or facilitating levels of social capital within society (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Foley and Edwards 1998; Lowndes and Wilson 2001; Portes 1998; Tarrow 1996; Taylor 2000; Woolcock 1998). Consistent with the spirit of such criticisms, this chapter examines state-linked grassroots organizations in Thailand and argues that while failing to conform to standard definitions of civil society organizations, they can in fact contribute in some circumstances to citizen voice and enhanced local governance. Municipal governments in Thailand initiated Cooperative Community Groups (CCGs)1 in the 1980s at the behest of the central government in a bid to strengthen local communities and reduce fiscal dependence on the state. As a result of decentralization policies in the late 1990s, CCGs assumed greater significance. In many municipalities, government leaders came to view the groups as a means of managing their suddenly expanded responsibilities. I argue below that the available evidence suggests that these new organizations have in many cases facilitated local administration and boosted responsiveness to local demands. The findings I report here are necessarily provisional. I have not yet been able to carry out longitudinal studies and my field research has been limited to a handful of Thailand’s thousands of local governments. My research, however, suggests that local leaders tend to look favorably on CCGs, in part as a tool to handle heavier administrative burdens. And local politicians see these groups as a way to create support for their own reelection campaigns. Regardless of what motivates national or local bureaucrats and politicians to create CCGs, they also appear in many cases to be useful instruments for citizens searching for ways to compel the state to provide services. In at least some cases, they may foster the development of new civic attitudes and behaviors. In these cases, participation in
CCGs may be creating trust among citizens that in turn makes possible new cooperative initiatives that do not rely on state support. Until the 1960s most of Thai society had undergone relatively few of the great transformations associated with industrialization and modernization. As late as the 1980s about four-fifths of the population lived in rural areas and derived the greater part of their modest incomes from low-productivity agriculture (Wyatt 2003; Baker and Phongpaichit 2005). While there was considerable regional variation, in general neither ecological nor political factors induced the development of high levels of cooperative activities or the kinds of corporate villages found, for example, in parts of Japan or Vietnam. While traditional rural society had elements of both horizontal solidarities and vertical patronage ties, the latter were overwhelmingly dominant. The focus of communal life revolved around village Buddhist temples. In many cases, these provided modest education and welfare services. They also served as centers for ritual affirmation of community identities (Moerman 1968; Phillips 1966). Associations in Thailand have generally not been of great economic or political importance. While in some parts of the country groups shared labor in harvesting crops and other activities, associational activity has been limited. Where associations have emerged, they have tended to be linked either to state initiatives or to the influence of a single individual, often a patron able to mobilize activity among his clients (Chenvidyakarn 1979). Traditionally, villages had relatively few associations. Until the 1970s, urban associations tended to be dominated by Chinese clans or other ethnicity-based groups. Only in the 1980s did a much richer associational world emerge in Thailand, initially in Bangkok. This social context is important to keep in mind when considering the impact of state support for CCGs, particularly in light of the questions raised in this volume’s Introduction concerning the crowding out of civil society. Rural Thailand’s lack of associational activity makes it less plausible that state-linked associations might displace bottom-up solidarities. In this case, it makes sense to focus less on possible harm done by state support for associations, and more on discernible benefits from them. Nonetheless, because these groups are typically the creations of bureaucrats and politicians, they are unlikely to be ideally suited to serve citizen concerns. (In some cases, local leaders fashion organizations on the basis of preexisting community groups, but this pattern is the exception.) Further, while traditional Thai rural society contained little that looked like civil society, there are some grounds for believing that this context is changing and that associational activities might grow.2 If that expectation proves correct, it raises the possibility that new citizen groups could be constrained by the need to conform to the template established by associations brought into existence from above. The analysis in this chapter draws on in-depth and follow-up interviews carried out between January 2002 and December 2005 with a number of CCG leaders, municipal bureaucrats, politicians, and residents in four municipalities in central Thailand. They are Chachoengsao (in Chachoengsao province), Bangbuatong (Nonthaburi province), and Sriracha and Chonburi (both in Chonburi province).
