ABSTRACT
Scientific realists take science seriously. First, they take the epistemic aims of science seriously. For realists, the main epistemic goal of science is to understand the world and how it works. While instrumentalists put the emphasis on prediction and practical applicability, realists think that this is not enough. Science should also aim to explain things. Second, realists take science seriously by setting high standards for the ultimate evaluation of scientific claims. While social constructivists and other non-realists might be satisfied with the consensus of the relevant community, realists think that scientists should be more ambitious: they should attempt to get things right. For realists, most scientific claims are about things that exist independently of the epistemic activities of scientists. According to realists, scientific statements are truth-apt: it makes sense to talk about their truth and falsity even if the entities mentioned in such statements are about the unobservable. The third indication of realists taking science seriously is the emphasis they put on the critical evaluation of current epistemic practices. The explanatory goals of science and the non-epistemic notion of truth give realists the standard according to which our methodological ideas should be evaluated. For a realist, it is entirely possible that the principles of evidential and explanatory reasoning employed within a scientific field are inappropriate for the goals of science.
