ABSTRACT

There is a well-known theory of natural kind terms which supposedly allows for the discovery of metaphysical truths. Based on this theory, Kripke has offered an equally well-known modal argument for a distinction between mind and body: any alleged identity between mental states and physical states will be couched in terms that are 'rigid designators' - they refer to the same things in all possible worlds in which they refer at all. So any identity between mental states and physical states must be a necessary identity, an identity in all possible worlds in which the terms of the identity have reference. But there are possible worlds in which the alleged identity between mental states and physical states does not hold. So, mental states are not identical to physical states. Presupposing one has rich enough Cartesian modal intuitions one can apparently resurrect the Cartesian ghost. 1

O'Shaughnessy claims that this essentialist theory of natural kinds is directly applicable to the metaphysics of physical action and that applying a roughly Kripkean strategy allows one to draw a substantial Cartesian, volitionist distinction in the realm of acting and trying and bodily movements. Focusing on certain basic descriptions of actions couched in terms of 'trying' and applying yet another Cartesian doctrine he calls 'psychological essentialism,' 0' Shaughnessy claims to derive an ontological distinction between 'the willing event' and 'the event willed.' 'Trying' is said to refer to, in part, a special kind of inner event essential to all physical action. This inner willing event causes the bodily movement and this whole complex constitutes an

action. The volitionism that he defends in terms of trying involves a kind of essentialism concerning physical action. The argument turns on the point I stressed already that trying is 'active' unlike sensation. If this modal argument were successful, it would avoid the difficulties with the epistemological arguments for conditional Cartesianism. Of course, this argument would not establish the epistemological thesis, but it would dovetail nicely with it: the modal argument would provide independent reasons for thinking the events one has access to while acting are of a special nature - they are willing events or volitions. However the specific essentialist considerations put forth in favor of this position either are not plausible or, when made plausible, are not powerful enough to establish volitionist conclusions concerning the nature of action.2 The willing of a limb movement may well be identical to the event of limb movement the agent performs. Out of the diagnosis of the shortcomings of this argument will naturally arise the suggestion of a basic, neutral notion of 'an agent's performing an event,' which I will employ in a non-volitional analysis of trying.