ABSTRACT
Throughout the history of philosophy, many have advanced the idea that there is a
connection between naturalism and nominalism. Specifically, many philosophers
have argued that naturalism requires a nominalist rejection of the existence of
properties construed along traditional realist lines as abstract, multiply-exemplifiable
entities that non-spatially inhere in their instances.1 Thus, in Sophist 246A-C, we read
these words from Plato:
In the contemporary setting, Howard Robinson remarks that “materialist theories are
incompatible with realist theories of universals. The tie between nominalism and
materialism is an ancient one.”2 Since most philosophers currently see physicalism
(which for our purposes can be used synonymously with materialism) as the best form
of naturalism, Robinson’s remark applies with equal force to a widely accepted
Stranger: What we shall see is something like a battle of gods and giants going on between them over their quarrel about reality.
