ABSTRACT
In our approach to the diversity of capitalisms, inequalities are neither one of the outcomes of a given form of capitalism, in the same way as growth, nor a fact that goes beyond the diversity of capitalism, because determined by the impact of globalisation or of technological progress. In our view inequalities (their intensity, their form) reveal something profound about the very nature of each kind of capitalism, in that they allow us to comprehend the nature of the underlying social compromise, notably concerning the division of value added and of risks (Lechevalier, 2011c). The social compromise is present in the concept of the Toyotist wage labour nexus developed by the régulation theory (Boyer & Yamada, 2000). Even so, in following Amable and Palombarini (2009), it seems more relevant to separate the analysis of the firm from that of social compromise, to study the latter in the perspective of political economy, even in the framework of the company-centred analysis of Japanese capitalism. The least that we can say is that the debate on the nature of the Japanese
social compromise has been lively. This debate has not been concluded even today, in the sense that the most recent developments have led to a revision of the bases of post-war capitalism, which requires a new kind of analysis (Lechevalier, 2011c). In our opinion, although it was segmented in the classic form of Japanese capitalism, it was fundamentally egalitarian in outcome, and even in intention. This is shown by the low level of inequality reached during the 1970s, comparable to what we could then observe in Scandinavian countries, following the admittedly imperfect indicator of the Gini co-efficient (OECD, 1976; Tachibanaki, 2005). However this may be, it is in the sphere of inequality and social compro-
mise that the turning point, or even the real rupture in contemporary Japanese capitalism, is most visible. This is characterised by a remarkable increase in the level of inequality, whose evaluation, however, is the object of heated debate.2 We interpret this rise in terms of ‘re-segmentation’ of the labour market, which is essentially the consequence of implementing neo-liberal policies as a whole, and in some smaller measure, of the crisis, following on from restructuring. The change of government in August 2009 nevertheless revealed the demand and the possibility of constructing a new social
compromise, namely the establishment of a real Japanese-style welfare state (Boyer & Lechevalier, forthcoming). This was the main manifestation of growing unhappiness in the population concerning the new level attained by inequality but also of a more general fear of downward social mobility (Lechevalier, 2014). The fact that this political change led to a failure, as symbolised by the coming back of Shinzo-Abe as prime minister in December 2012, does not mean that the dissatisfaction with the level of inequality reached during the Koizumi administration and its aftermath was not real (see Chapter 1).
