ABSTRACT
After spending over two years endeavouring to preserve the peace achieved through the treaty of London in 1518, by the summer of 1521 England was moving uncertainly towards renewed war. The tangled diplomacy of these years need not concern us here, but throughout 1520 relations between the King of France and the newly elected Emperor, Charles V had continually deteriorated.1 Francis was the aggressor, and Charles angled strenuously for an English alliance. In May 1521 he obtained it at the secret treaty of Bruges, but Wolsey continued to hope for a mediated settlement, and managed to deflect Henry's enthusiasm for an immediate campaign. There was talk of an invasion, and of the destruction of the French fleet, but no effective mobilization was ordered. The King lost interest and went off hunting, leaving Wolsey free to resume his tortuous diplomacy. By August he was using the threat of an open break to bring the French to the conference table, but that was the limit of his effectiveness; he could not bring about a settlement. On 24 November he signed a second treaty at Bruges, committing England to war against France. A naval campaign was to be conducted in the summer of 1522, and in 1523 the Emperor and the King of England were to co-ordinate a double invasion.2 The autumn of 1521 was consequently a somewhat tricky time. During September, Henry for some inexplicable reason suddenly became concerned that the French would suspect what was intended and impound the considerable assets of the English merchants in Bordeaux. Wolsey endeavoured to reassure him, arguing that if the 1 For a discussion of the politics following Charles's election as Holy Roman Emperor
English ships did not appear as usual, the likelihood of suspicion would be much greater. Their correspondence became quite acrimonious before the King was eventually persuaded - or again lost interest. At that time, and for some months thereafter, no warlike preparations would have been visible. The majority of the King's ships, 22 in number, were docked or anchored along the Thames from 8 October to 23 March. Routine winter patrols were maintained. On 3 November Richard Pace reported to Wolsey that both John Hopton and Robert Brigandyne had been forced to bring their ships into harbour by bad weather, and that Brigandyne's - the Katherine Forlileza - had been badly damaged.1 It was not until April that new orders were issued to the fleet, and that active preparations commenced; which was no way in which to seize the initiative for an aggressive stroke.
