ABSTRACT
G. E. Moore's gnosis may seem to be attenuated by the comparatively commonplace character of what he claims to know: it covers what he calls the common-sense view of the world. A great deal of Moore's most valuable thought is, he believe, still contained in lecture notes, and will be published by Dr Lewy. Another reason for Moore's general overshadowing is that his most brilliant philosophical work, like that of Russell, was early: it extends to about 1925. The substantive character of the Moorean gnosis is of course plainer when we turn to his views on analysis. Moore plainly treated his analyses with the greatest of seriousness. What is interesting about Moore's treatment of universals is his cold attitude to qualitative universals, such as salmon-pink and whiteness. Nor is a philosopher like Austin a mere worshipper of ordinary speech, though his occasional tidying up of our usage certainly does not go as far as the analyses of Moore.
