ABSTRACT
The problem of manipulation can profi tably be construed as a problem of deviance. In troubling cases of manipulation, psychological elements such as desires and beliefs, among other things, are acquired via causal routes that are deviant relative to causal routes deemed normal or, as we abridge, relative to causal routes that are baseline. Reconceptualizing the problem in this manner makes it more tractable. It challenges all parties to come to grips with what baseline is being presupposed either in a positive account of authentic springs of action-conative or doxastic elements that play an action-producing role and that arise in typical responsibility non-subverting fashion via “innocuous” causal routes-or in denunciations of either a proposed account of authenticity, or some compatibilist or incompatibilist characterization of control. In addition, lucidly articulating the baseline assumed, either in a criticism or constructive proposal, facilitates evaluation of that baseline.
