ABSTRACT
Against the backdrop of political, economic and social crises taking place in 2024, this research paper critically examines why and how the Interim Government emerged in Bangladesh. The study uses secondary data sources to examines the discourse on transitional governance mechanisms to the extent that efforts to restore electoral credibility, rising political polarization, economic vulnerabilities and civic dissatisfaction, has made the discourse necessary. Historical analysis of Bangladesh's caretaker governments and comparative frameworks from transitional democracies such as Nepal and Pakistan highlight both the potential and pitfalls of interim arrangements. The risks are high of normalizing extra constitutionally, but nobody is suggesting that in the absence of a carefully constructed Interim Government that is time bound, is rooted in constitutionalism and the inclusive dialogue, public trust can be restored and electoral integrity safeguarded as well as democracy stabilised. The study highlights civilian oversight and international engagement as a future pathway of democracy but at the same time that does not undercut institutional resilience. The research shows that implementation will be successful only with political consensus, judicial safeguards, and civic vigilance, providing Bangladesh with a unique moment of restoring democracy in the face of internal and external pressures.
