ABSTRACT
In November 2002 a middle-aged government official in southern China fell ill with a virulent pneumonia that did not respond to typical therapies.1
A month later a young chef who worked in a restaurant specializing in exotic wildlife in the booming city of Shenzhen presented similar symptoms and sought treatment at a county hospital near his parents’ home. Unable to improve the young chef’s breathing, the hospital transferred him to a Guangzhou military hospital, and after three weeks on a ventilator he recovered. Many months later, laboratory results would identify both men as infected by the SARS virus; initially, though, neither case suggested a novel virus or the specter of a global epidemic. (Abraham 2005: 31)
By late January, however, the situation had become more ominous. The number of cases of atypical pneumonia multiplied and several cases could be directly traced to contact between the chef and those who had treated or visited him in the hospital. The resistance of the disease to antibiotic treatment and the rapid spread among hospital staff and then to their family members alarmed provincial public health experts who quickly alerted the Chinese Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Soon after, a team traveled from Beijing to Guangzhou to meet with Dr. Zhong Nanshan, head of the Guangdong Institute for Respiratory Disease. (Abraham 2005: 32) Led by Dr. Zhong, they discovered that the atypical pneumonia spread via respiratory droplets and outlined preventive measures of quarantine and infection control within hospitals. (Abraham 2005: 33) Despite their clear recommendations and professional expertise, central government officials failed to follow through and the virus continued to spread.
