ABSTRACT
This chapter draws a clear example of the corruption syndrome in Russia: a reverse evolution of bureaucracy where corruption has become a natural discourse. The explanatory scheme of corruption prevalent in the 1990s focused primarily on the economic motives of participants. Corruption was perceived as profit from an illegal transaction with the usage of authority. Initial studies in the 1990s emphasized the involvement of the political and economic elite as the principal causes provoking corrupt practices. The main reasons for widespread corruption in Russia were seen as the tradition of small bribes formed in the Soviet past; the presence of a “top-down” system, forcing businesses to engage in corrupt relations; and a universal concept of total corruption.
The authors argue that the “functioning” of corruption that is observed at the different levels of social relations offered in the majority of studies of corruption, may have been lost in the macro and social labeling constructions. The authors propose that the implementation of oligarchic power is only possible in the context of institutional imbalance, supported by many participants of the regulatory function. Corruption is reproduced in everyday, routine relations even when there are no direct transactions related to obtaining benefits.
