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Chapter
Indeterminate Truth and Credences
DOI link for Indeterminate Truth and Credences
Indeterminate Truth and Credences book
Indeterminate Truth and Credences
DOI link for Indeterminate Truth and Credences
Indeterminate Truth and Credences book
ABSTRACT
When one allows truth to be indeterminate, “fixed point” interpretations can be found even when the language includes sentences such as the liar paradox. In this chapter this kind of account is applied to rational credences, to find non-undermining indeterminate epistemic states even in certain situations which have been discussed as challenges for rationality. In the process of doing this, a deeper understanding of how the supervaluational account of truth works is obtained, especially when one focuses on sets of precisifications.