ABSTRACT
This chapter considers whether the use of racial profiling in policing contexts constitutes morally unjust discrimination. Referring to the findings of the empirical research on procedural justice, the chapter argues first that profiling undermines legitimacy and erodes compliance, calling into question consequentialist arguments that racial profiling can sometimes be justified on the basis of its alleged social benefits. The chapter also argues that consequentialist views misunderstand both the extent and type of harm suffered by targeted groups, especially the magnitude of the process-related harms brought about by profiling. Second, the chapter aims to develop a new, non-consequentialist objection to racial profiling. Drawing on the resources of recent philosophical work on striking property generics, it argues that profiling posits an untrue association between certain social groups and negative properties. Thus profiling violates the state’s obligation to treat citizens with equal respect. The chapter concludes that targeted groups’ perceptions that the criminal justice system is unfair and disrespectful are therefore justified, because profiling actually does constitute disrespectful treatment.
