ABSTRACT
The political theory of Benjamin Constant (1767–1830) is nowadays read and understood in light of one central claim: that it represents the commonsensical position that governmental authority can (and should) be at once popularly grounded and limited by more fundamental rules and norms. As a result, Constant’s conception of limited popular sovereignty, the idea that popular sovereignty has a limited rather than an absolute extension, and that certain fundamental rights are by definition outside its scope, has taken centre stage. The positive flipside of that conception, i.e. what Constant took popular sovereignty to mean within those limits, has remained underdeveloped. On the basis of Constant’s 1815 Principles of Politics, this chapter develops a reconstruction of and a reflection on Constant’s positive conception of popular sovereignty. The main claim is that Constant distinguishes between ‘governmental power’ and ‘sovereign power’. The latter concerns the particular political power to establish or withdraw the legitimacy of governmental power through assent. It is not a collective power; it is exercised by the individual and consists of critical judgment.
