ABSTRACT
The author explores structural patterns and interest group characteristics as well as issue-specific and socio-economic factors that shape lobbying tactics in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia. First, he tests the hypothesis that ideational groups are more likely to pursue outside lobbying tactics because they continuously need to reinforce their members’ loyalty. Sectional groups, by contrast, tend to focus on insider tactics and thus more frequently lobby the parliament and government because they seek material benefits for specific groups of people. Second, he examines how the nature of the issue affects lobbying tactics. When the debated issue is divisible, groups are more likely to see direct interaction with policy-makers. When groups pursue non-divisible goals, they are more likely to “go public”. He also tests whether groups seeking to protect the status quo will mainly approach bureaucrats and politicians, while groups seeking to dismantle the status quo seek to widen the scope of the policy conflict by going public. Finally, Czarnecki examines to what extent the different lobbying regimes of the three countries impact the chosen strategies of organized interests.
