On National Security Intelligence

This chapter presents a case for intelligence to be understood as institutionalised joint epistemic activity in the service of national security decision-making in an adversarial environment.. This definition is important to show how intelligence practices differ from that of military practice. That is, in warfare, the primary activities involve kinetic or physical actions. In intelligence, however, the primary activities are epistemic even if intelligence is used to support the military in warfare. They involve multiple individuals cooperatively collecting and analysing information in order to better understand the world; national security intelligence activity is joint epistemic activity. However, we argue that a comprehensive account of intelligence activity cannot stop there – intelligence practices are institutionalised joint epistemic activity. A single collector may gather intelligence on a particular target, but this is only part of a comprehensive institutionalised intelligence practice. Thus, we argue that intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination constitute institutionalised joint epistemic activities. Again, however, we argue that a proper definition of intelligence cannot stop there. In order to describe how intelligence operates and to differentiate it from other forms joint epistemic activity, intelligence must be seen as adversarial, the adversaries in question being nation-states or, in relation to much intelligence concerning terrorists, between nation-states and non-state actors.. Finally, we develop the teleological approach in terms of the aimed-at collective good of national security to focus our analysis on national security intelligence. This clarification and focus present the case for an institutional approach to intelligence ethics.