ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at espionage, the collection and analysis of the secret intelligence of hostile foreign states. One set of issues concerns the normative theoretical framework justifying espionage (in our restricted sense of that term). In short, what are the purposes or ends that justify the institutional activity of espionage as a means? It was argued in Chapter 2 that espionage and other national security intelligence activities are ultimately justified by the collective moral good of national security. A second set of issues concerns the particular moral principles that ought to govern the institutional practice of espionage as a means. The principles of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality, discussed in Chapter 4, come to mind and it is assumed that they have application to espionage. However, it is argued that there is an additional principle, namely, a principle of reciprocity in play. In relation to the need for recourse to a principle of reciprocity, it is argued that while espionage is typically a harmful activity, nevertheless, the moral wrongness of harmful espionage activity can be mitigated if it is reciprocal. It is also argued that espionage is frequently, if by no means always, a species of “dirty hands” epistemic activity.
