ABSTRACT
This chapter distinguishes between voluntary and imposed transparency, and examines the dynamics of imposed transparency in settings in which an existing social conflict is present. I analyze the effectiveness of imposed transparency in achieving strategic goals and try to determine whether imposed transparency can facilitate greater openness between conflicting sides. The dynamic of imposed transparency is examined here using two interconnected case studies from contemporary Israel/Palestine: the case of the large checkpoints (“terminals”) operating within the West Bank to restrict Palestinians’ movement and the case of Israeli NGOs operating to safeguard Palestinians’ human rights. Each case is analyzed as a series of moves and countermoves, and so emphasizes how the different actors of each case influence and respond to each other. Imposed transparency, which is achieved through surveillance, emerges from this research as a limited tool to attain one’s goals, especially once other actors have had the chance to react. It also emerges as a process that does not favor the weak, and that can paradoxically lead to more opaqueness.
