ABSTRACT
This chapter shows that where donors essentially pursue selfish interests, and care less about local policy ownership and implications of policy reforms to the power and influence of the political leadership of recipient countries, there is a greater risk for reform failure. However, where donors allow aid recipient countries to own, shape and navigate the reforms, there are higher chances of reform success and sustainability. Two donor-supported public sector reforms (PSRs) in Uganda are used to demonstrate this argument. In one PSR where the government had the leverage to determine the needs, pace and mode of implementing the sensitive defence reforms according to its political interests, the results were relatively impressive. Conversely, Uganda’s public service reform process, whose content, pace and direction of reforms were influenced and driven by donors, stagnated, and the results were disappointing. Furthermore, policy reforms need not be overly many and ambitious for countries experiencing institutional and managerial incapacities. This chapter concludes by examining the reasons for variations in the two reforms and draws lessons for future policy reforms.
