ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses how memory and imagination justify beliefs. There are at least two ways in which a source of justification justifies beliefs: (1) by generating new justification and (2) by preserving pre-existing justification that has been generated by some other sources. Does memory justify beliefs in the former way (generativism about memory) or in the latter way (preservationism about memory)? Does imagination justify beliefs (if it does at all) in the former way (generativism about imagination) or in the latter way (preservationism about imagination)? This chapter critically examines an argument, which we call the “argument from psychological generativity”, to the conclusion that both memory and imagination justify by generating new justification. According to the argument from psychological generativity, first, both memory and imagination are psychologically generative (i.e., generating new representations) and, second, psychological generativity implies epistemic generativity (i.e., generating new justification). The argument from psychological generativity fails, and we explain why and how it fails. We will not dispute the premise that both memory and imagination are psychologically generative, but we reject the other premise that psychological generativity implies epistemic generativity. In other words, even if it is true that both imagination and memory generate new representations rather than preserving prior representations, this does not mean that they generate new justification rather than preserving prior justification.
