ABSTRACT
Political equality is a central feature of democracy but one that is continually under siege in a capitalist society from the power of the rich and business. This is intrinsically unfair and creates one risk of policy being skewed from the common good. What role can constitutions – bodies of codified and entrenched higher law – play in limiting these risks of oligarchy? The chapter discusses two possible approaches that constitutional designers might take to this problem. First, a well-designed constitution can anticipate the potential impact on policy from oligarchic power and seek to limit this impact by increasing safeguards in certain policy areas, e.g., in relation to social rights and environmental policy. Second, a well-designed constitution can include political institutions and processes that are designed to push back against oligarchic power itself, e.g., through creating empowered ‘plebian’ or citizens’ assemblies. We argue against relying too heavily on the first approach as the attempt to constitutionalise public policy can unduly circumscribe democratic politics as well as mitigate potential oligarchic influence. We also argue against relying too much on any one specific kind of institution in pursuing the second approach. We argue therefore for a pluralist stance across and within the two approaches.
