ABSTRACT
The concluding chapter provides a summary of the findings from this book along with comparative analyses that draw from the case study chapters and an expert survey completed by the contributors. It reveals important similarities among populists in opposition in democratic countries, among populists in government in democratic countries, and among populists in government in nondemocratic countries, but also notable variation that we explore by systematically considering how political, institutional, and social/economic contexts shape populist responses to COVID-19. Our analyses reveal that populists are more likely to be denialist and opposed to public health measures in presidential systems, when politics is more personalistic, in comparatively poorer countries and when state capacity is low. We also learn that while all populists invoked “the people” in their COVID-19 response, it was generally only those in opposition who actively sought to perpetuate crisis, by conflating it with general political and representational crises that they frame in reference to issues over which they have ownership. We conclude the chapter and the book by considering the implications of these findings for our understanding of the relationship between populism and crisis, the trajectory of populism, and its potential consequences for democracy.
