ABSTRACT
This chapter argues for a rebalancing of the “epistemic equilibrium” in classics. To do this, it first makes an argument against Miranda Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice, advancing that credibility excesses should fall under the definition of testimonial injustice. From here, the chapter applies the concept of testimonial injustice to the classics classroom, drawing Jose Medina’s work which calls for recognising that the classroom setting involves many immediate contrastive, comparative and interactive. Building on other work from Medina, the chapter develops his concept of “epistemic resistance” and puts it into dialogue with Nora Berenstain’s “epistemic exploitation”. These two concepts are used to analyse specific moments that might occur in a classics classroom and to attempt to offer corrections to potential instances of injustice. Ultimately, this chapter calls for the instances of injustices to not be merely avoided but transcended, again by rebuilding who counts as knowledge seekers, and questioning what knowledge in classics might look like without strict boundaries.
