ABSTRACT
The chapter aims at scrutinizing central aspects of the implementation of the Swedish strategy with regard to available evidence and evidence-based medicine criteria. Its method is a review of the events based on official statements, mass media reporting and literature with particular reference to the spring (March–June) of 2020. Results of the chapter show that under the leadership of Folkhälsomyndigheten (FHM), Sweden abandoned full-scale testing and contact tracing in the end of the second week of March 2020 (with the main exception of hospital patients and risk groups), and did not start to resume these WHO-recommended actions in full scale until well into May 2020. Restrictions enhancing social distancing were looser than in other Nordic and European countries, and looser than recommended by the WHO. Indirect belief in natural herd immunity (not included in the official version of the strategy), strong reliance on individual responsibility, arguments against facemasks in crowded public places and neglect to follow recommendations from the WHO and cooperate internationally also wholly or partly contradicted available levels of evidence and experience. The chapter leads to the following conclusions: With a lack of both intervention and longitudinal observational studies in the very beginning of the pandemic, following recommendations from WHO based on cruder study designs and practical experience would have been appropriate. The FHM put very high demands on evidence supporting protective measures but low demands on evidence supporting the implemented strategy.
