ABSTRACT
We regularly face the question what we should do in the particular situations we find ourselves in. One response is to attend carefully to the situation, attempt to discern what is at stake and see what should be done. This response is advocated by Iris Murdoch and is expressive of her account of moral vision. In this chapter, Murdoch’s account of moral vision – a capacity to discern moral reality and the right course of action – is explored. The chapter’s aims are twofold. First, to provide a thorough analysis of how she understood our capacity for moral vision. This will require an explanation of the background to her account of moral vision (Section 2.2), an elaboration of the very concepts of ‘vision’ and ‘moral vision’ (Section 2.3), and a clarification both of her descriptive understanding of moral vision as mere subjective perception (Section 2.4) and of her normative understanding of moral vision as attention (Section 2.5). Second, to develop a critique of Murdoch’s thoughts on this subject. It will be argued that, for all the virtues of her account of moral vision, it neglects the importance of deliberation for ethical life (Section 2.6).
