ABSTRACT
Albert the Great’s theory of intellect has recently been treated mainly on the basis of works already available in critical editions. However, Albert’s most important work on this matter, De intellectu et intelligibili, written in the period around 1257–1262 CE, is not yet available in a critical edition. It is therefore not surprising that there is as yet no adequate account of his theory’s development, sources, and structure. Rereading the theory in light of Albert’s complete works, this chapter, first, illumines the systemic coordinates and doctrinal elaboration of his theory of intellect in its mature form. Second, it discusses Albert’s answer to the question of whether the nature of intellect is superindividual and common to all human beings, or particular and individuated. The chapter shows that, based on the Peripatetic tradition and with special reference to Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Albert founded a philosophical science of the intellect and its object as a subdiscipline of psychology for the first time in the Latin West, and assigned it to natural philosophy. He ascribed an existential relevance to that science, since it brings about the self-knowledge of man as man and knowledge of the principle of man’s happiness.
