ABSTRACT
This chapter surveys North Korean maritime operations in the Yellow Sea, of the type that might be termed either “gray zone” or “gray zone-adjacent,” given their often asymmetric, ambiguous, and incremental nature. Different from China with its far more limited capabilities in general, and its lack of a robust Coast Guard, or any Maritime Militia, in particular, North Korea must rely almost exclusively on its Navy for its adversarial maritime operations. With lesser capabilities, fewer options, and arguably higher immediate stakes, Pyongyang deploys the Korean People’s Navy to contest the Northern Limit Line (NLL). This chapter provides a detailed overview of the instances of North Korean gray zone operations in the past. The primary purpose of North Korean gray zone operations in the Yellow Sea is to change the status quo regarding the NLL, which disadvantages North Korean access to this economic and strategically vital body of water on its self-declared terms. However, Pyongyang’s use of force and violence through gray zone tactics will not succeed because it will only reinforce security concerns and strengthen Seoul’s resolve to maintain the NLL until there are significant improvements to inter-Korean relations.
