ABSTRACT
While its manifest function was to remove religion and spirituality from the hearts and minds of ordinary people, the unintended function of the communist-era anti-religious policies was to legitimize religious denominations as righteous victims of repression and violence, emboldening clergy to advocate for a greater role of religion in public and private life, and bringing the ordinary folk to church, synagogue, or mosque once communist-era restrictions on freedom of religion were removed. The communists dismissed religion as the “opium of the masses” and religious leaders as retrograde troublemakers, but after 1989, citizens in democratizing East Central Europe saw religion as a refuge from daily hardships, a safe space of communion with fellow believers, and a personal improvement tool able to provide a measure of certainty in times of extreme political and economic precarity. On their part, post-communist politicians appealed to religious themes, symbols, and leaders when wishing to win elections, even when their personal convictions bordered on atheism. Overt gestures of piety have made presidents of electoral candidates ready to publicly broadcast their spirituality and outcasts of candidates unable to pay lip service to God. Under communism, religious groups that were denied their basic rights, were driven underground, or had their social work drastically curtailed became, almost overnight, some of the most trusted institutions in these new democracies. In the name of democracy, the weak post-communist states that embarked on the political and economic reforms necessary to discard communism and build democracy had to bend to the will of religious majorities, but one unintended function of the privileged relationships, thus, forged was to benefit these majorities well beyond their share in the population. Indeed, religious majorities have represented some of the most powerful interest groups in the region, drawing on reserves of legitimacy, credibility, and capital that other interest groups, social movements, and even political parties could only dream of. During the 1990s religion was palatable to many more East Central Europeans than left-wing or right-wing ideologies discredited by decades-long failure to protect basic human rights, including the right to religion, and to attain social prosperity on par with Western standards.
