ABSTRACT
This chapter gives analyses on formation and durability of coalition governments in Bulgaria (2008–2021). The data suggest testable and generalizable hypothesis. It divulges the extent the coalition governance is a result of established principles or of non-written behind the scene relations and influences. The studied coalition governments reveal the actors and structures that participate in negotiating and carrying coalition policies. They disclose if and how coalition governance is impacted by political parties, by the prime minister (PM), and by the coalition partners' ability to compromise. While political compromises are necessary for encouraging coalition governance, they are not sufficient. Bulgarian case reveals the role of the PM as substantial. Coalition governance is likely to be influenced by the parties, their strength to negotiate the fulfilment of their promises and to balance between preserving their ideologies and compromising to retain power. Even when parties' support is available, obtaining benefits in coalition governance involves costs of its own, specifically in the periods of crises, as are the ones under study. The financial crisis, Covid pandemic, inflation, and the war in Ukraine increase the tensions between parties and do not lead to unified response to public expectations resulting in low trust to state institutions.
