ABSTRACT
How important is it to grasp the phenomenal dimension of other minds for gaining explanatory understanding of other agents who act for reasons? The author will address this question by first expressing some scepticism about the viability of the common distinction between affective and cognitive empathy and/or between affect sharing and perspective-taking. In the second section, the author will then more fully explore how his distinction between basic and reenactive empathy allows him to acknowledge the affective dimension of empathy and, most importantly, how the author regards reenactive empathy as at times including a phenomenal dimension. When we look more closely at the structure of rational agency, mental states can be grasped as reasons for actions only if they are recognized to be fittingly integrated into a complex web of our other mental states and only insofar as they are ultimately related to what we care about. Finally, the author argues that even if we acknowledge a form of purely experiential or affective empathy such empathy does not possess any uniquely explanatory value. It has however a practical value in allowing to provide emotional support to another person.
