ABSTRACT
This chapter explores German musings about two potential alternatives to U.S.-provided extended deterrence: Franco-German nuclear cooperation and Germany acquiring its own nuclear deterrent. Even though these debates flared up in response to the election of Donald J. Trump in 2016 (and his possible reelection in the future), they have come to the fore again with the war in Ukraine, with leading conservative German politicians now weighing in in favor of a so-called “Eurodeterrent” or increased cooperation with Paris. The chapter discusses the feasibility of these musings in terms of the obstacles that would have to be surmounted, including an estimate of the German breakout time. For both options—Franco-German cooperation and a German deterrent—the chapter concludes that the obstacles are extremely high. Pursuing either of the two options would come at tremendous political cost and likely make Germany and Europe less secure. In the end, these musings are a symptom of Germany's sometimes uneasy dependence on the United States coupled with a lack of strategic substance in German defense debates.
