ABSTRACT
Actual possibilities are ones such as the possibility that it will rain tomorrow. At least for this subject, we proceed most efficiently not with possible worlds but by working directly with possibilities as given with individual statements. The root idea for actual possibility is “what has not been ruled out by what has occurred up to now”, and the paper develops this ansatz in a number of ways. The chapter then examines the extent to which this conception of actual possibility is subject to difficulties that apply to Lewis's notion of ersatz possible worlds. The present approach narrows the modal assumptions that would be required by appealing to ersatz possible worlds to the assumption of an open future. The present approach facilitates focus on the actual possibilities for which we have an adequate vocabulary, leaving it open to how this store may be expanded when we develop new concepts. The paper sketches how one can proceed in the practical resolution of vagueness in the statement of actual possibilities and ends with an extension of the analysis to cases of actual possibilities presented, not with statements, but with things like pictures and models.
