ABSTRACT
This chapter examines first two broadly Hegelian variations of the freedom-justice connection by Axel Honneth and Rainer Forst, respectively, and then critically contrasts them with Hegel’s own concept of “concrete freedom” as the immanent ideal of social life and of Hegel’s state as its “actuality.” It is argued that this concept is capacious enough to do justice both to the human capacity in principle for context-transcending reflection on the justness of the social order central for Forst and to the limitations in practice of individuals and groups for transcending the embeddedness and particularity of their perspectives emphasized by Honneth. The question of what makes a theory of a good society also a theory of justice is raised at the beginning with regard to Honneth’s account, and a reason stemming from the ontology of objective spirit is suggested at the end with regard to Hegel’s.
