ABSTRACT
We argue that the relation between imagining having a certain conscious experience and possessing a phenomenal concept of that experience is less straightforward than it might seem. We defend the following claims: (1) A subject may have acquired a phenomenal concept of a conscious experience and yet be unable to imagine the way it is like to have that experience. This is so even in some cases where one possesses what we call a pure and maximally specific phenomenal concept, that is, a concept that (inter alia) enables one to attribute an experience to another subject by thinking in terms of the specific way it is like for that subject to have that experience. (2) Having the capacity to imagine what it is like to have a given experience does not necessarily imply having the capacity to use a corresponding phenomenal concept of that experience. (3) One may attribute in thought a conscious experience to another subject via a pure and maximally specific phenomenal concept without engaging, in that act of thinking, in imagining the way it is like to have that experience. Nevertheless, thinking in terms of phenomenal concepts and imagining having experiences are phenomena that are intimately related in ways that we explore in this chapter. They are both instances of attitudes with what we call for-a-subject content (content concerning the way it is like for a subject to have certain properties or to be in certain situations). They thereby manifest our awareness of ourselves and others as experiencing subjects.
